This paper investigates the economics of infamous pirate practices. Two closely related economic theories-the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building-explain these practices. First, I examine the pirate ‡ag, "Jolly Roger," which pirates used to signal their identity as unconstrained outlaws, enabling them to take prizes without costly con ‡ict. Second, I consider how pirates combined heinous torture, public displays of "madness," and published advertisement of their …endishness to establish a reputation that prevented costly captive behaviors. Pirates'infamous practices reduced their criminal enterprise's costs and increased its revenues, enhancing the pro…tability of life "on the account."
Introduction
Few characters in history inspire as much fascination or mystery as pirates. Pirate symbols, from skull-emblazed ‡ags, to eye patches and wooden legs, pervade modern popular culture. Despite this, or perhaps because of it, in many people's minds pirate fantasy and reality are indistinguishable.
Buried treasure, colorful captains, and salty sea talk are permanently part of pirates'intriguing lore.
Many infamous pirate practices are pure …ction. But a number of others not only have historical foundations. They have rational choice foundations as well. This paper considers two such practices: pirates' infamous ‡ag of skull and bones, the "Jolly Roger,"and pirates'infamous fondness for torture. Two closely-connected economic theories-the theory of signaling and the theory of reputation building-explain these practices. My discussion contributes to a small but growing literature that uses economics to analyze the pro…t-maximizing strategies of organized criminals. Its analysis is most closely connected to Gambetta's (1993 Gambetta's ( , 1994 and Smith and Varese's (2001) important examinations of signaling and reputation building in the context of the Sicilian Ma…a. 1 I investigate signaling and reputation building in pirates' context and explore novel aspects of these theories' application that the unique features of pirates' criminal enterprise create. My analysis illuminates the strategies criminals use to establish their identities and how they coordinate on these strategies; the communication mechanisms criminals use to broadcast and manipulate their public images and thus propagate their reputations; and the obstacles criminals confront in dealing with their victims and how they overcome them.
Buried Treasure: A Note on Sources
To explore the economics of infamous pirate practices, I consider late 17th-and early 18th-century (1660-1730) sea bandits who occupied the waterways that formed major trade routes surrounding the Bahamas, connecting Europe and the North American sea coast, between Cuba and Haiti, and around Madagascar. These areas encompass major portions of the Atlantic Ocean, Indian Ocean, Caribbean Sea, and Gulf of Mexico. The trade routes connecting the Caribbean, North America's 1 See also, Reuter (1983) . Becker (1968) was the …rst to apply the logic of rational-choice decision making to criminals. Following him, a number of others extended this logic to decision making in the context of Atlantic sea coast, and Madagascar formed a loop called the "Pirate Round" that many pirates traveled in search of prey.
My investigation draws on the most important primary source historical documents relating to pirates. The …rst of these is Captain Charles Johnson's General History of the Pyrates (1726-1728), which contains reports on a number of history's most famous pirates related by a pirate contemporary. 2 I also draw on Alexander Exquemelin's (1678) invaluable account of the 17th-century buccaneers. Exquemelin was a surgeon who sailed on a buccaneering vessel and provides a detailed …rsthand account of their raids and pro…t-maximizing strategies. Buccaneers di¤er from "pure" pirates in that they frequently plundered ships with government sanction. However, other times they plundered without o¢ cial permission, as full-blown pirates. These proto-pirates, many of whom turned to pure piracy when governments stopped issuing licences for plunder, in ‡uenced and anticipated pure pirates'practices in the "Golden Age" (1716-1726), which this paper focuses on.
Additionally, I draw extensively on court records from pirate trials, 18th-century newspaper accounts of pirate activity, which as I discuss below played an important role in publicizing pirates' reputation, and the Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and West Indies (CSPC ), which contains correspondence from colonial governors and others relating to piracy. I also rely on papers from London's Public Records O¢ ce (PRO), which is a veritable treasure trove of primary source historical materials relating to pirates. 3 Finally, a few pirate captives, such as William Snelgrave (1734) , published longer works describing their captivities. I also draw on these accounts, which provide important …rsthand records describing infamous pirate practices. 4 Like all economic histories of persons long dead, this one, too, is unavoidably conjectural.
Historical persons rarely left detailed records telling us why they behaved in the ways they did, let 2 "Captain Johnson" is a pen name used by the author of A General History of the Pyrates. His true identity remains unknown. In 1932, John R. Moore claimed that Johnson was in fact Daniel Defoe. In the late 1980s, however, this view was overturned (see, Furbank and Owens 1988) and today many pirate historians do not believe that Defoe is the author of this important book (see, for instance, Cordingly 2006; Rediker 2004; Woodard 2007 ; for the opposing view see, Rogozinski 2000) . Whatever Johnson's true identity, it's agreed that he "had extensive …rst-hand knowledge of piracy" (Konstam 2007: 12) . While it's acknowledged that Johnson's work contains some errors and apocryphal accounts (such as the community of Libertalia), "Johnson is widely regarded as a highly reliable source for factual information" on pirates (Rediker 2004: 180) and remains a de…nitive source historians rely on in constructing their accounts of late 17th-and early 18th-century piracy. As eminent pirate historian David Cordingly put it, this book "is the prime source for the lives of many pirates of what is often called the Golden Age of Piracy" (2006: xx). 3 With the exception of those from the Boston New-Letter, many of which I collected independently, unless otherwise noted all newspaper accounts are reprinted in Baer (2007: vol. 1) . 4 Additionally, this paper relies on and is greatly indebted to a voluminous modern literature covering all aspects of piracy, including those considered here, written by contemporary historians. Some of the best discussions belong to Rediker (1987 Rediker ( , 2004 , Cordingly (2006) , Gosse (1946) , Rankin (1969) , Pringle (1953) , Konstam (2002) , and Rogozinski (2000) . alone explicating the economics that underlaid their behaviors. This is especially true of pirates, who are not only persons long dead, but were criminals, and largely illiterate ones to boot. The economist's job is to take the fragmentary, often indirect, historical data that are available and to put them together using the "glue" of economic logic, …lling in the holes those data create with that logic along the way, to create a fuller, more informative historical picture than the data alone present.
3 Skull & Bones: The Economics of the Jolly Roger
Surrender or Die
To maximize pro…ts pirates had to minimize costs. Chief among these were the costs associated with battling potential prizes. Pirate ships often outmanned and outgunned their quarries by a factor of three or more. But merchant ships weren't defenseless. Most carried some armaments.
Winning a battle with a pirate crew was unlikely. But damaging the pirates and their ship wasn't.
Battle-sustained deaths or injuries were costly to pirates: dead or injured men made less able sea dogs than living or uninjured ones.
Battle-sustained damage to pirates' ship was costly too. It reduced pirates' e¤ectiveness in chasing and defeating later prey. A pirate ship with a hole in it was slower and less agile than an undamaged one. Since pirates stole their ships, a damaged ship also reduced pirates'ability to take undamaged ones as replacements. 5 A damaged vessel required repair. But more time repairing meant less time plundering and a higher probability of capture. Walter Moore, for example, captain of the Eagle, captured George Lowther's pirate crew while it careened on an island o¤ Venezuela.
Pirates also found battle costly because it could damage the prize. Pirates valued stolen ships since they sometimes "traded up" when they took a better vessel. A damaged ship was less useful to them than an undamaged one. In the extreme, if pirates inadvertently sunk their target, the entire prize would be lost. Thus violent con ‡ict not only contributed to the cost side of pirating expeditions. It could diminish the revenue side as well.
To minimize these costs, pirates sought to overwhelm victims without violence. "[T]heir whole policy was directed towards taking prizes without having to …ght for them" (Pringle 1953: 113) .
Pirates'strategy was simple. First, promise to slaughter merchantmen that resisted them. As one 5 In the early 18th century pirates didn't fence ships they stole. Pirates valued vessels as means of piracy and on rare occasions for ransom. But pirates don't seem to have participated in anything like market for plundered ships.
pirate described this promise to a prisoner, "'No Quarter should be given to any Captain that o¤ered to defend his Ship'" (Snelgrave 1734: 206) . Second, promise to show mercy to merchantmen that surrendered peacefully. By manipulating targets'incentive to yield to them-dramatically raising targets'cost of resistance while simultaneously raising the bene…t of surrender-pirates hoped to capture merchantmen without violence Crucial to this strategy's e¤ectiveness was pirates'ability to credibly commit to their "surrenderor-die" policy. However, for reasons similar to those that made con ‡ict costly for pirates in the …rst place, following through on their promise to slaughter resistant merchantmen after subduing them was also costly. Pirates didn't reap any immediate bene…ts by punishing a merchantman after they overcame it and controlled the prize. This was as true for vessels pirates had to …ght for as it was for those they didn't. In contrast, pirates could incur immediate costs by ful…lling their deadly promise. Merchant sailors anticipating their execution might hazard a last, desperate hand-to-hand resistance that could maim or even kill one or two members of the pirate crew. Thus, in the short run at least, massacring resistant merchantmen yielded pirates net costs rather than bene…ts.
This created a commitment problem for pirates' promise to punish resistors reminiscent of incumbent …rms'commitment problem in promising to punish entrants in Reinhard Selton's (1978) "chain store paradox." Pirates overcame this problem by invoking the same solution the Gang of Four identi…ed for incumbent …rms in this situation: reputation. Following Milgrom and Roberts (1982: 304) , the theory of reputation building predicts that if pirate victims were multiple and could observe pirates'past actions, pirates could maximize their long-run payo¤ by building a reputation for mercilessness toward resistors that deterred future merchantmen from resisting. 6 And that's what pirates did. Pirate captain Edward Low "had [a victim's] Ears cut o¤ close to his Head, for only proposing to resist . . . [his] black Flag" (Johnson 1726 (Johnson -1728 . In another case, Low's crew came upon a ship, "and because at …rst they shewed Inclinations to defend themselves and what they had, the Pyrates cut and mangled them in a barbarous Manner" (Johnson 1726 (Johnson -1728 . Similarly, Bartholomew Roberts'pirate crew assaulted a Dutch interloper, which, after "mentaining an obstinate defence for four hours . . . killed a great many of the pirates."
Ultimately, however, the interloper "being overpower'd was forced to submit and what men the pirates found alive on board they put to death after several cruel methods"(News from Barbadoes, Antigua and Jamaica -Sent April 25, 1721 from Governor Bennett to the Council of Trade and 6 See also, and Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) .
Plantations, CSPC, February 18, 1721: Item 463 iii, Vol. 32 (1720-1721), pp. 294-296).
The same costliness of following through on pirates'deadly promise to resistant merchantmen made pirates'commitment to follow through on their peaceful promise to compliant merchantmen credible. Because murdering a compliant merchant crew was costly and provided no o¤setting reputational bene…t, as murdering a resistant crew did, pirates had no incentive to slaughter compliant merchant crews. In fact, pirates had a strong incentive not to kill victims that surrendered. Rather than reducing pirates' cost of taking future prizes, slaughtering compliant merchant crews would increase pirates'cost of taking future prizes.
If merchantmen expected pirates to murder them whether they resisted or not, they would have an incentive to always resist pirate attacks, undermining pirates'purpose. Resisting would be no costlier than surrendering. Since there was at least a chance resistance might succeed, merchantmen would always want to do so. Thus the theory of reputation building predicts that pirates would ful…ll their promise of mercy if merchantmen surrendered.
Consistent with this prediction, pirates reserved annihilation for resistant crews. They showed mercy to those that surrendered peacefully. As one pirate pointed out to his captive, pirates "observe strictly that Maxim established amongst them not to permit any ill usage to their Prisoners after Quarter given" (Snelgrave 1734: 219) . Victims who accepted pirates'o¤er (peaceful submission for your life) not only lived to tell the tale of pirate mercy. In some cases they lived to tell the tale of pirate generosity. This explains why the British government had to resort to legal sanctions to compel armed merchantmen to resist their pirate attackers, which it did, though unsuccessfully, in a 1721 statute (8 Geo. I, c.24). Because merchantmen received mercy when they surrendered to pirates, they didn't hesitate to do just that. 
Pirates earn their largest payo¤ when the merchantman doesn't resist them and they don't slaughter its crew, P . Pirates take the target without a costly …ght. Further, they contribute to a reputation for kindness to cooperative targets. Pirates earn a smaller payo¤ if the merchantman surrenders but pirates slaughter its crewmembers anyway, P . Pirates take the target without a costly …ght. But they damage their reputation for kindness to cooperative targets. Pirates earn a still smaller payo¤ if the merchantman resists and they slaughter its crew in response, ' P . In this case pirates engage in a costly con ‡ict. But they contribute to a reputation for mercilessness toward uncooperative targets. Pirates earn their smallest payo¤ if the merchantman resists but pirates "wimp out"and don't slaughter its crew as punishment, P . Pirates su¤er a costly con ‡ict.
Further, they damage their reputation for mercilessness toward resistant targets. So for pirates:
This game of complete and perfect information has a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium: merchantmen surrender to their pirate attackers and pirates spare merchant crewmembers'lives in return. Pirates'surrender-or-die policy maximizes piratical pro…t.
Pirates'surrender-or-die policy and their associated reputation for adhering to its terms spread to prospective prizes through word of mouth and newspaper reporting. An article published in the Boston News-Letter highlights how pirates'reputation for adhering to this policy was known to sailors and how newspaper reporting unwittingly contributed to and helped spread pirates' reputation by reiterating for sailors the consequences of resisting pirate assault. As the article reported, merchantmen "that have made Resistance have been most barbarously butchered, without any Quarter given them, which so intimidates our Sailors that they refuse to …ght when the Pirates attack them" (Boston News-Letter June 16-June 23, 1718).
Newspaper reporting also publicized pirates' commitment to treat merchantmen that surrendered peacefully with mercy. One paper published pirate captain Ned Low's company's articles, which enshrined pirates'peaceful promise in writing. This was "Good Quarters to be given when Craved," the newspaper pointed out (Boston News-Letter August 1-August 8, 1723). Newspaper reporting on the consequences of acquiescing to or resisting pirate attack is just one way the 18th-century media unwittingly facilitated pirates'pro…t-enhancing strategies. Media coverage was also indispensable to helping pirates cultivate and cash in on a lucrative reputation for punishing uncooperative captives and rewarding cooperative ones. I discuss this in Section 4.
Bringing in the Black Flag
Pirates'desire to minimize the cost of overtaking prey explains their policy toward merchantmen.
But, by itself anyway, it doesn't explain why pirates ‡ew the Jolly Roger. To understand why pirates used this ominous ‡ag and its connection to pirates'policy discussed above, we must turn to signaling theory. This theory predicts the use of costly signals when there are multiple "types" of agents whose identities are important in shaping some third party's decision about how to act toward them but whose identities aren't directly observable.
Pirates found themselves in precisely this situation. They were one of two major types of belligerent mariners that merchantmen traveling in and around the Caribbean might confront in the early 18th century. The Jolly Roger was the costly signal pirates used to distinguish themselves from the other type-the Spanish coast guard.
"Guarda Costa" were government-commissioned vessels charged with protecting Spanish terri-tories from illicit foreign traders called "interlopers." In theory, the coast guard was restricted to taking interlopers near the coasts it protected. In practice, these ships often cruised the waters far from shore in search of other countries'merchant vessels carrying any goods they could use to justify seizing in alleged violation of the law that restricted trade with Spain's possessions in the Caribbean. 7 In 1726 London's merchants petitioned government o¢ cials imploring them to address the problem. "It has been a general practice, with the subjects of his Catholic Majesty in the West Indies," they wrote, "for several years past to …t out vessels in a warlike manner, on pretence of gaurding their coasts from unlawful traders: but, in reality under colour of such commissions have committed many depradations, and other acts of hostility, on your Majesty's subjects, on the high seas, and even on the coasts of Jamaica . . . It is notorious those guarda de la costa's, as they are called, never met with an English vessel, and could overcome, which they did not take, destroy British merchant sailors and colonial o¢ cers criticized the Spanish coast guard for inhumanely treating prisoners they took under questionable commission. Nevertheless, as government-sanctioned cruisers, at least in principle, authorities limited the viciousness coast guard vessels could show toward merchant crews they assaulted. 8 Unlike pirates whose outlaw status meant they weren't even theoretically constrained in how they could treat merchantmen they encountered, coast guards weren't permitted to wantonly slaughter merchantmen that resisted them once these crews cried for quarter. This important di¤erence between pirates and legitimate belligerents points to the problem pirates faced. If a merchantman believed it was under coast guard, as opposed to pirate, attack, it would have a greater incentive to resist its attacker, undermining pirates'ability to prevent costly con ‡ict through their surrender-or-die policy.
This helps explain captain William Wyer's crew's response when Wyer asked his men if they would "defend their ship"from an unknown approaching belligerent. " [T] hey answered, if they were Spaniards they would stand by him as long as they had Life, but if they were Pirates they would To reap such rewards from their reputation, pirates needed a signal that distinguished them from coast guard attackers and communicated their piratical identity to prospective prizes. That signal was the Jolly Roger. Ironically, rather than an emblem of blood-thirsty pirates, the Jolly Roger re ‡ected pirates'strong desire to avoid violent con ‡ict with prey.
The …rst recorded account of the Jolly Roger is on the pirate Emanuel Wynne's ship in 1700.
A witness described it as "A Sable Flag with a White Death's Head and Crossed Bones in the Fly" (quoted in Grey 1971: 17) . Although, as I discuss below, it was but one of several similarly themed, though di¤erent, pirate ‡ags, the skull-and-bones motif has received the most attention.
Pirates coordinated on this theme for their ‡ags through their common background in legitimate life. Nearly all sea scoundrels were ex-merchant or Royal Navy sailors. 9 Even more so than today, 8 English privateers, for example, were instructed: "That no Person or Persons taken or surprised by you in any Ship or Vessel as aforesaid, though known to be of the Enemies side, be in cold Blood killed, maimed, or by Torture or Cruelty in humanly treated contrary to the Common Usage or Just Permission of War" (The Arraignment, Tryal, and Condemnation, of Capt. John Quelch 1704: 21). 9 Some pirates turned from merchant service to piracy via mutiny. Leeson (2010b) examines the economics of in the early 18th century, seafaring was a dangerous occupation. Many sailors died from accident, disease, or violence. A common way of denoting sailors'deaths in ship records was to draw a small skull and bones next to their names in the ship's log. In a macabre twist on this shared experience, as pirates, former merchant and navy sailors adopted this well-known symbol of death to signal their identity (Rediker 1987: 279) .
Pirates'reliance on their shared experience as legitimate seamen as a focal point in coordinating the imagery that graced their ‡ags is similar to Ma…osi's reliance on Hollywood movies about Ma…a life to settle on the signals they use to establish their identity (see, Gambetta 1994; Varese 2006b). 10 In both cases, behaviors and symbols that were common knowledge to each outlaw group's respective members-in the one case because of a common occupational history, and in the other because of popular and readily provided Hollywood stereotypes-assisted organized criminals in coordinating on useful signals of their respective identities. 11 As I discuss below, the familiar pirate logo, a "large black Flag, with a Death's Head and Bones a-cross,"was but a starting point for many crews, which modi…ed their ‡ags using this basic design the purpose was the same in each case. As one witness described it in the pages of the White-hall Evening Post, the "black Flag with a Death's Head in it . . . is their Signal to intimate, that they will neither give nor take Quarter" (White-hall Evening Post October 18-October 21, 1718). By communicating "pirate" to merchantmen, the Jolly Roger helped merchantmen understand they were under attack by piratical belligerents who could and would devastate them if they resisted, as opposed to "legitimate" belligerents who were likely to be more restrained in how they responded to resistance.
There was one problem, however. For the Jolly Roger signal to create a separating equilibrium, mutiny on 18th-century merchant ships. 1 0 Varese's (2006b) fascinating paper discusses the Ma…a's participation in the creation of its Hollywood image-a manipulation of popular perception similar in many respects to pirates' manipulation of their image through 18th-century newspaper reporting, discussed in this paper. 1 1 Another interesting similarity between pirate and Ma…a signaling practices relates to their names. As Gambetta (1994) points out, with varying degrees of success, Ma…osi adopt colorful nicknames for themselves and even give attention to the way they name their criminal out…ts. Pirates displayed similar behaviors. Several pirate captains had special nicknames, for instance, Blackbeard being the most famous, but also "Calico" Jack Rackam, "Black Bart" Roberts, and so on. Similarly, pirates named their vessels with particular, and memorable themes in mind. The names of nearly 20 percent of a sample of 44 early 18th-century pirate ships, for instance, refer to revenge (Rediker 1987: 269) . Unlike other pirate and Ma…a signals, these naming signals are cheap and easily appropriated by fakers. Still, it seems reasonable to conclude that they must have provided some, at least temporary, bene…t or else these organized criminals wouldn't have resorted to them. which here refers to merchantmen's ability to perfectly infer whether their attacker is the piratical or legitimate variety based on whether it ‡ies the pirate ‡ag or not, the Jolly Roger must be cheap for pirates, but prohibitively expensive for coast guards, to use.
The Jolly Roger was inexpensive for pirates. Pirates were already outlaws. If they were caught, their punishment was the same whether they ‡ew the black ‡ag or not-hanging. In contrast, because legitimate belligerents weren't outlaws, but ‡ying the Jolly Roger would make them so, One of the clearest ways for a coast guard to "plainly prove"it was pirating was to ‡y a pirate ‡ag. It wasn't the only way. Foreign authorities sought to capture and prosecute coast guards that exhibited any clear pirating behavior. But since the Jolly Roger was a well-known emblem of piracy, carrying it was prima facie evidence one had stepped beyond the bounds of legitimate cruising into the realm of sea banditry. As the court declared at the trial of Bartholomew Roberts' crew, the accused had acted "under a Black Flag, ‡agrantly by that, denoting your selves common Thus, compared to coast guards that operated near their government's coasts and used national ‡ags-i.e., coast guards that didn't behave like pirates-those that ‡ew pirate ‡ags increased the In the same way that, as Gambetta (1994) and Smith and Varese (2001) point out, the success of Ma…a signals, such as pinstripe suits and dark sunglasses, encourages fakers to appropriate them, partly undermining these signals'e¤ectiveness, so too did the pirate ‡ag's e¤ectiveness in facilitating easier merchantman surrender encourage some coast guards to appropriate the Jolly Roger, in e¤ect faking pirate status. The primary factor reducing the cost of the Jolly Roger for some coast guards was a lower probability of capture. British resources were limited. Not all colonial governors had the same ability to send ships after pirate ‡ag-hoisting coast guards. Further, some coast guards, because of better ships or more competent crews, could evade authorities more easily than others.
Not all coast guards were equally susceptible to capture if they ‡ew the Jolly Roger. The lower the chance a coast guard had of facing punishment for cruising under the pirate ‡ag, the closer its cost of using the Jolly Roger was to pirates'cost of doing so. The inconsistencies and imperfection of maritime enforcement, which lowered the cost of ‡ying the Jolly Roger su¢ ciently for some coast guard vessels to make doing so pro…table, contributed to the semi-separating nature of the resulting signaling equilibrium.
Because some coast guards also used the pirate ‡ag, merchant ships couldn't determine their attackers'identity with certainty. So, while the Jolly Roger was positively correlated with attackers' "fearsomeness" (i.e., their ability to annihilate resistors), it wasn't perfectly so. As a result, some merchantmen surely resisted pirate attack under the belief their attacker was a poseur. Despite its cleverness, the Jolly Roger couldn't eliminate pirates'cost of merchant ship resistance.
But neither was it totally ine¤ective. If it had been, neither pirates nor coast guards would have bothered to use it. Indeed, by all accounts the Jolly Roger worked extremely well in preventing violent con ‡ict with merchantmen. As one pirate historian notes, "In the great majority of cases merchant ships surrendered without a …ght when attacked by pirates" (Cordingly 2006: 121) . This suggests the number of pirate poseurs was modest, which explains how the Jolly Roger managed to remain "so e¤ective" for pirates "that they hardly ever needed to kill" (Pringle 1953 one tiny pirate crew exhibited. Though they had only …ve crewmembers among them, they "sail'd away down the Coast, making them a black Flag, which they merrily said, would be as good as …fty Men more, i.e. would carry as much Terror" (Johnson 1726-1728: 371). 13 1 3 Consistent with my theory for why 18th-century pirates ‡ew the Jolly Roger, modern-day pirates, who predominantly ply the waters o¤ the Horn of Africa, ‡y no ‡ag at all. Unlike their Caribbean predecessors, modern face no problem in communicating their identity to targets. They have no need for a signal to distinguish their identity because, unlike in the 18th century, today, there are no other belligerents that merchant ships may be accosted by on the sea. If a vessel approaches with crewmembers pointing guns, the target can conclusively determine that that Coast guards weren't the only mariners who threatened to undermine the Jolly Roger's e¤ective-ness. Certain members of the pirate community threatened to as well. Not all pirate crews were equally strong or e¤ective. Some had more crewmembers. Others had more …repower or better ships. Further, some pirate captains were more capable leaders than others. The "gentleman pirate," Major Stede Bonnet, had all he could do to …gure out how to pirate at all. Bonnet was so clueless he actually purchased his …rst pirate ship (whereas proper pirates stole theirs) and paid his crewmembers …xed wages (whereas proper pirates were compensated in shares of booty).
A weaker, inept pirate crew could ruin the Jolly Roger's e¤ectiveness for stronger, more able ones. If a merchantman happened to resist despite seeing the pirate ‡ag, the weak crew might be forced to ‡ee, or worse yet, be defeated. If this happened often enough, the Jolly Roger's toothy grin would cease to operate as a symbol to be feared and submitted to. Even stronger pirate crews would then confront resistance more often, resulting in the costs they devised the Jolly Roger to avoid.
Pirates' solution to this dilemma was simple: they customized their ‡ags. The classic skulland-bones on black pattern was but one of a large variety of crew-speci…c Jolly Rogers pirates Because they tended to share basic color schemes and themes, pirate ‡ags were similar enough to signal "pirate,"but di¤erent enough to communicate the identities of the particular crews that sailed under them. This permitted stronger or more e¤ective pirate crews to internalize the bene…ts of their strength and aptitude, preventing weaker and less able crews from free riding on their strength and undermining the Jolly Roger's e¤ectiveness. Eighteenth-century newspapers, which published pirate victims'accounts, sometimes described the particular ‡ag the crew they encountered sailed under, as well as its manpower and …re power, and even the disposition of the captain or other Weaker crews don't seem to have attempted appropriating the particular ‡ags of stronger ones.
There's a good reason for this. Even at its peak, in any year during piracy's Golden Age (1716-1726), the pirate population was relatively small-about 2,000 men. Further, according to Marcus Rediker, more than 70 percent of these pirates can be genealogically connected to only three pirate captains (1987: 267). Many of these rogues lived on and operated from a small number of land bases. The most important of these was the one Woodes Rogers went to squelch at New Providence in the Bahamas, which most pirates called home in the early 18th century. The pirate population was modestly sized and close knit. Thus a weak crew that tried to steal a stronger crew's ‡ag would have faced a strong likelihood of being discovered and punished by the stronger crew. Besides, at least in some cases there was a better, much safer, way of enjoying the bene…t of a stronger, more e¤ective pirate crew. If it could convince a stronger crew to allow it, a weaker crew might sail in consort with the stronger one. This is ultimately what Major Stede Bonnet's pirate crew did, joining Blackbeard's crew brie ‡y as it plied North America's Atlantic coast.
Walk the Plank: The Economics of Pirate Torture
Unfortunately for pirates, even after they boarded a prize that peacefully surrendered to the Jolly Roger, their job was far from …nished. After taking control of their prey, pirates needed to locate the loot. The problem they faced in doing so was simple enough: victims weren't keen to give it up.
Merchantmen readily submitted to their pirate attackers at the sight of the Jolly Roger. Per pirates' surrender-or-die policy, they knew their fate if they didn't: death. This policy worked because pirates could easily observe resistance. It's hard to miss gun…re and canon shot coming in one's direction from a target, or to miss the fact that the target is running after it has been commanded to heave to. But pirates'surrender-or-die policy wasn't e¤ective in preventing forms of resistance that were typically much harder to observe, such as hiding valuables, or throwing them overboard.
For example, the cook aboard one of Roberts'prizes attempted to stash away his "Rings and To prevent captives from engaging in behaviors that were harder to observe but equally damaging to their pro…t, pirates sought to develop a reputation as men who would unleash unspeakable savagery on those who crossed them. To successfully create this reputation pirates needed to achieve three closely related goals. First, they needed to establish their image as men who could easily be pushed over the edge. Second, they needed to establish a reputation for going berserk when this occurred. Finally, they needed to advertise their reputation.
Pirates achieved their …rst goal by behaving like men on the brink of sanity in front of those they overtook. One way they did this was by fostering a "devil-may-care" image among the legitimate persons they interacted with. Pirates loudly proclaimed to those they overwhelmed that they feared neither death nor the law. As the British Journal reported, the members of one pirate crew declared to their captives that "They have no Thoughts of ever being taken, but swear, with the most dire Imprecations, that if ever they should …nd themselves over-power'd, they would immediately blow their Ship up, rather than do Jolly Roger the Disgrace to be struck, or su¤er themselves, to be hang'd like Dogs"(British Journal August 22, 1724) . As the Boston News-Letter reported, according to another pirate prisoner, his captors went about "often saying they would not go to Hope Point in the River of Thames to be hung up in Gibbets a Sundrying . . . for if it should chance they should be Attacked by any Superiour Power or Force, which they could not master, they would immediately put …re with one of their Pistols to their Powder, and go all merrily to Hell together!" (Boston News-Letter August 15-August 22, 1720).
Pirates projected this attitude to such an extent that it became something of a sea-dog slogan.
As Bartholomew Roberts famously boasted, "a merry Life and a short one, shall be my Motto" Pirates further cultivated their image as madmen who could snap and be propelled into a violent rage at the slightest transgression by destroying cargo, throwing parcels of goods overboard, and torching ships that weren't up to their piratical standards after overtaking prizes. Consider how a victim of Bartholomew Roberts'crew described his predators'antics in the Boston News-Letter.
According to the victim, Roberts'men proceeded "with madness and rage to tare up the Hatches" this victim reported, "they met with two or three Bibles, at the sight whereof some started and said, They had nothing to do with them; or with God, nor any thing Above"(Boston News-Letter August 4-August 11, 1718). Those who witnessed such behavior or read about it in newspapers were terri…ed to make any moves that might unleash the pirates'devilish appetites. Pirate "madness" had precisely the e¤ect pirates desired.
Pirates achieved their second goal-establishing a reputation for going berserk when they were pushed over the edge by prisoners hiding or destroying booty-by responding to such behavior in the most brutal way they could: with heinous torture. This is the primary reason pirates spent so much time, as one court remarked, "making their Hellish Inventions for unheard of Barbarities" (Tryals of Sixteen Persons for Piracy 1726: 14). 15 There were two types of pirate torture that a¤ected pirates'reputation. The …rst, "torture-forinformation," only contributed to pirates'reputation indirectly. As its name suggests, torture-forinformation aimed at extracting information about the location of hidden valuables from prisoners.
If pirates suspected a prisoner was holding back valuable loot, they would torture him until he …guratively or literally spilled his guts-whichever came …rst. As I discuss below, torture-forinformation's helpful e¤ect on pirates' reputation was a bene…cial by-product, or side e¤ect, of torture pirates used to extract information from stubborn victims.
An important and distinguishing feature of torture-for-information was its potential immediate pro…tability. Like slaughtering resistant merchantmen, torturing captives who hid or destroyed 1 4 In the same way that 18th-century pirates don't seem to have been able to fence ships, it's likely they had di¢ culty fencing bulky cargo in some cases as well. In other cases pirates simply didn't have room on their ships for additional cargo. In such cases, burning vessels, throwing cargo overboard, and so on was therefore not as costly a form of cultivating an image as "hair triggers" as it seems. 1 5 Although pirates chie ‡y used torture for pro…t-serving purposes, as in any population, in the pirate population, too, there were some psychopaths who in ‡icted harm on others for entertainment.
valuables could be costly to pirates. A prisoner who realized torture was forthcoming might …ght back, injuring, or even killing, his torturer. Perhaps more important, torture took time-especially the slow and painful varieties pirates were partial to described below. Time pirates spent torturing captives was time they couldn't spend searching for their next prize. Despite these costs, because torture-for-information enabled pirates to uncover hidden booty-booty potentially valuable enough to more than o¤set torture's costs-torture-for-information could yield pirates immediate net bene…ts.
The second kind of pirate torture, "torture-for-reputation,"contributed to pirates'reputation directly and, as its name suggests, was administered for this purpose. Unlike torture-for-information, torture-for-reputation always generated immediate net costs. Torturing a prisoner who pirates suspected of destroying loot involved the costs of torture discussed above but couldn't create the o¤setting bene…ts that torture-for-information could: destroyed booty was unrecoverable. This presented a problem for pirates because, to establish the reputation they sought, pirates needed to brutally punish all uncooperative captive behaviors relating to loot, including those that destroyed booty. Thus, similar to pirates' policy to massacre merchantmen that resisted the Jolly Roger, pirates confronted a credible commitment problem when it came to torture-for-reputation.
As in the case of the Jolly Roger, here too, the theory of reputation building explains how pirates were able to overcome this problem. Although torture-for-reputation involved more immediate costs than bene…ts, by contributing to pirates'reputation for brutalizing uncooperative captives, it could dissuade future captives from revenue-eroding behaviors, enhancing pirates' pro…t. Torturing a victim who pirates suspected of destroying booty was a piratical investment that prevented future captives from doing so. In the same way that pirates' larger long-run payo¤ of developing a reputation for slaughtering resistant merchantmen enabled them to credibly commit to this policy despite the immediate net costs that doing so created, pirates'larger long-run payo¤ of developing a reputation for brutalizing prisoners who destroyed booty enabled them to credibly commit to torturing resistant captives even when this created immediate net costs.
Credibly committing not to torture compliant prisoners was more straightforward. As noted above, torture always yielded immediate net costs when pirates didn't suspect a prisoner of hiding anything. So it wasn't in pirates'short-run interest to torture compliant captives. Further, wantonly brutalizing prisoners would render torture ine¤ective for pirates' purpose, undermining the reputation they sought to build rather than contributing to it. If pirates developed a reputation for assured torture, and thus captives expected to be savaged whether they delivered up their valuables or not, captives wouldn't …nd hiding or destroying loot costly. So it wasn't in pirates' long-run interest to torture compliant captives either. The theory of reputation building therefore predicts that pirates would show mercy to compliant captives, reserving barbarity for those they suspected of hiding or destroying booty.
Pirates'use of torture is consistent with this prediction. Far from abusing compliant captives, pirates sometimes showed kindness toward them. William Snelgrave's pirate captors were so pleased with him that by the end of Snelgrave's captivity they o¤ered to gift him a ship loaded with valuable cargo (Snelgrave 1734: 220-228). Merchant ship captain Knott similarly enjoyed pirate "gifts" following his crew's capture in 1720. The pirates "took what they wanted out of the merchantman and gave him money and goods of a very considerable value for the same" (CSPC, May 31, 1720:
Item 33 i, vol. 32 (1720-21), pp. [18] [19] . Rather than brutalizing prisoners indiscriminately, pirates reserved torture for resistant captives as the theory of reputation building predicts. As pirate captain Sam Bellamy put it, "I scorn to do any one a Mischief, when it is not for my Advantage" (Johnson 1726-1728: 587). 16 As discussed above, pirate "Mischief " was "for [pirates'] Advantage" when it yielded information about the whereabouts of hidden booty (torture-for-information) or contributed to a reputation for punishing uncooperative captives who destroyed booty, preventing costly captive behaviors on future ships (torture-for-reputation). This response to passive prisoner resistance wasn't speci…c to Low. Pirate captain Charles Vane 1 6 Of course, pirates could, and did in some cases, wrongly torture on suspicion of a captive having hidden or destroyed valuables. In one case, for instance, an unfortunate woman who several buccaneers captured "was by some set bare upon a baking stone and roasted, because she did not confess of money which she had only in their conceit" (John Style to 'the Principal Secretary of State, Whitehall,' CSPC, January 4, 1670, Item 138, Vol. 7 (1669-1674), pp. [49] [50] [51] . But pirates couldn't a¤ord to make this mistake too often lest torture's ability to improve their pro…t be destroyed. 1 7 Reprinted in Dow and Edmonds (1996: 206) . To another pitiful fellow who refused to divulge the whereabouts of booty, "they tied long cords to his thumbs and his big toes and spreadeagled him to four stakes. Then four of them came and beat on the cords with their sticks, making his body jerk and shudder and stretching his sinews.
Still not satis…ed, they put a stone weighing at least two hundred-weight on his loins and lit a …re Pirates achieved the …nal goal required to establish their reputation-communicating their reputation to others-by relying on word of mouth and newspaper coverage to publicize this status.
For word of mouth to be e¤ective, pirates required survivors who could relay the consequences of resisting their demands to others. Thus, although in some cases it was "good Policy" to sink a captured vessel after relieving her of plunder "to prevent her returning to tell Tales Spotswood was never himself taken by pirates, he could have only arrived at this conclusion after hearing about pirate generosity from sailors pirates had taken.
Perhaps the most e¤ective means of spreading pirates'reputation was through newspaper reporting. In addition to relating information about pirate movements, captures, and facts about crew composition, newspapers also related information from pirate victims and released pirate prisoners. Many of the reputation-building incidents described above-from pirates'aversion to Bibles to Blackbeard's toast to death-were published in newspapers for the public to consume. "There is no doubt," one Blackbeard historian notes, "that Blackbeard was conscious of the public image he had created" and worked diligently to maintain it (Lee 1974: 22) . As discussed above, in newspaper coverage of pirates'activities "Something about their temper might be included to help persons that confront them in the future," which, together with word of mouth, helped spread such captain-or crew-speci…c reputations (Baer 2007 I: 282) . Speci…c temperaments were attached to speci…c pirate crews similar to the way speci…c ‡ags were. This helped particular pirate crews internalize the bene…t of their reputational investments. The second factor that helped ameliorate the destructive e¤ect of reputational free riding is the fact that torture-for-information, which pirates engaged in for extra-reputational purposes, produced reputation-enhancing e¤ects as a side e¤ect, or by product. By torturing captives who withheld information about the location of hidden valuables, pirates not only extracted information that immediately increased their revenue. They also contributed indirectly to their reputation as men who would respond with violent rage toward any uncooperative prisoner behavior. This supported the reputation pirates sought when they tortured speci…cally for this purpose, as well as the reputation they sought when they murdered resistant merchantmen. Critically, the direct bene…t of torture-for-information-recovered booty-was enjoyed exclusively, and thus fully internalized, by the torturing pirate crew. Thus, even in the face of potential reputational free riding, pirates retained an incentive to torture-for-information, which contributed to their reputation indirectly as well.
Concluding Remarks
My analysis of the economics of infamous pirates practices leads to several conclusions. First, like both legitimate persons and other organized criminals, pirates pursued pro…t in a world of asymmetric information. Merchantmen had di¢ culty observing the kind of belligerent that was attacking them, which might be pirate but also might not. This asymmetry created a problem for pirates who relied on their outlaw identity to shape targets' incentive to resist them through a surrender-or-die policy. To deal with this problem, pirates developed a signaling device-their infamous ‡ag, the Jolly Roger. Also like for other actors, reputation was crucial to pirates'pro…t maximization. Merchant sailors were tempted to hide or destroy their valuables, leaving pirates with less to show for their e¤orts. To prevent such behaviors from eroding their pro…t, pirates worked hard to develop a reputation for punishing uncooperative captives and rewarding cooperative ones, increasing their haul.
These lessons from studying the economics of infamous pirate practices echo and strengthen our understanding of lawful …rm behavior and, in particular, the industrial organization of legitimate industry. 18 Lawful …rms face similar information problems to those that pirates faced, though the particulars are of course quite di¤erent. It should not be surprising then that these lawful …rms' fundamental practices are similar to the ones that pirates used. For example, pirate signaling as a way to distinguish themselves from "competitors" who threatened to hurt pirates'pro…t has its parallel among legitimate …rms that seek to make sure that a few "bad apples" in their industries don't spoil things for everyone. To distinguish themselves from such spoilers, legitimate …rms make costly up-front investments in their buildings, signage, and so on-investments that signal the reputation of the …rms that undertake them since they're too costly for ‡y-by-night …rms to imitate (see, for instance, Williamson 1996) .
Lawful …rms'costly investments of this sort not only signal their credibility to otherwise underinformed consumers. These investments are costly in the short run but pro…table from a longerrun perspective. Such investment behavior mirrors pirates'investment in their policy of death for resistors and mercy for cooperators, which was costly to employ in the short run but, by contributing to a useful reputation, proved important to pirate pro…t-making in the longer run. These features of legitimate industrial organization may also be important to lawful …rms in ensuring that competitors don't copy important aspects of their brand name, logos, and so on.
Although, unlike for pirates, the government enforces legitimate …rm trademarks, litigation is costly and slow. Thus the ability to monitor and punish competitors who violate such rules informally, for example through industry-wide boycott or similar measures, which pirates enjoyed, is important even in lawful industries.
Second, my analysis highlights the fact that organized criminals in general, and pirates in particular, are public relations-savvy. To spread and strengthen the reputations they build, organized criminals rely on word of mouth and cleverly capitalize on mass media. Pirates, for example, demonstrated an ability to control or "spin"popular perception of themselves by strategically engaging in certain behaviors in front of others and releasing captives who promoted the image pirates sought.
By relaying stories about pirates directly to one another through word of mouth and indirectly to each other through newspaper reporting, pirate captives and early 18th-century mass media unwittingly contributed to pirates' reputation, facilitating pirates' ability to avoid pro…t-eating costs.
Third, my analysis points to the importance of shared experience as a mechanism organized criminals use to coordinate on speci…c signals (such as ‡ags) and the symbolism attached to these signals (such as skulls and bones), to communicate their identity to prey where that identity is otherwise di¢ cult to observe. Common cultural, occupational, or other backgrounds within a particular criminal population provide useful focal points for signaling behavior. To the extent that important elements of these backgrounds are widely recognized and understood by the legitimate persons that criminals prey on-such as Ma…osi stylings, publicized and partially created by Hollywood, or skulls and bones, well known as an emblem of death to the maritime community pirates preyed on-this usefulness is further strengthened.
Finally, this paper highlights that pirates' behavior has a rational choice explanation at its foundation. Economists, and even many non-economists, accept this proposition about criminals in general. However, when it comes to pirates, the rational choice foundation underlying observed behavior is easily forgotten or ignored. In large part this is because pirate practices are often entertaining, outlandish, and, owing to their popular treatment, even appear mysterious. In reality, however, the colorful features of pirate practice derive from the unique context that early 18th-century pirates operated in rather than any di¤erence in, or dearth of, pirate rationality or self-interest. Pirates' infamous practices were rationally chosen responses to the conditions they confronted in their pursuit of pro…t and can be understood using insights from basic economic theory.
